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Abstract 
We estimate various panel fiscal reaction functions, including those of the main categories of 
general government revenue and expenditure for 12 Euro area member states over the 1970-
2013 period. We find that in the peripheral countries where sovereign bond yields decreased 
sharply in the years 1996-2007, fiscal stance ceased to respond to sovereign debt 
accumulation.  This was due to lack of sufficient adjustment in government non-investment 
expenditure and direct taxes. In contrast, in the core member states ,which did not benefit 
from yields’ convergence related to the Euro area establishment, responsiveness of fiscal 
stance to sovereign debt increased during 1996-2007. It was achieved mainly through 
pronounced adjustments in government non-investment expenditure. Our findings are in 
accordance with predictions of theoretical model by Aguiar et al. (2014) and are robust to 
various changes in modelling approach. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although the European sovereign debt crisis burst five years ago
1
, its causes still remain 
unclear. There are three explanations of the crisis which differ in respect of assessment of pre-
crisis fiscal policy in peripheral countries of the Euro area (i.e. in Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain).  
According to the first narrative, the debt crisis was closely linked to the global financial 
crisis which pushed peripheral member states into particularly deep recession resulting in 
huge fiscal deficit and exploding sovereign debt. This narrative emphasizes that before the 
outburst of the global financial crisis fiscal, deficits in the peripheral member states were low 
and sovereign debt levels rather stable (see, e.g. Bronner et al., 2014).  
The second narrative links the sovereign debt crisis to unsustainable fiscal policy which 
peripheral member states were running after joining the Euro area. According to this 
narrative, these countries could anticipate a bailout by the remaining member states for either 
political reasons or due to the fear of financial contagion (see, e.g. Baskaran and Hessami, 
2013).  
The third explanation (see, e.g. Aguiar et al., 2014) points to the following mechanism. 
The prospects of joining the Euro area allowed peripheral countries to benefit from higher 
credibility of remaining member states. This opportunity weakened incentive of their 
governments to spend less in order to borrow cheaply, while leaving their impatience 
unchanged.
2
 Thus, they loosened their fiscal policy. Nevertheless, this policy change was not 
driven by anticipation of a bailout by the remaining countries (as suggested by the second 
narrative), but by a windfall of lower interest payments. However, when the global financial 
crisis spawned fears of Euro area disintegration
3
 and the windfall disappeared, fiscal policy 
run by peripheral countries turned out to be unsustainable.    
Empirical literature on pre-crisis fiscal sustainability in the Euro area has been growing 
fast in recent years. Nevertheless, it does not provide evidence unambiguous enough to 
confirm one explanation and reject others. For example, Baldi and Staehr (2013) do not find 
different fiscal reaction functions, for the pre-crisis period, in countries which eventually 
experienced serious sovereign debt problems, compared to the ones less affected. In contrast, 
Baskaran and Hessami (2013) find some evidence that introduction of the Euro and, in 
                                                     
1. The crisis is described in details, e.g. by Lane (2012) and Shambaugh (2012). 
2. By the same token, if credibility of the remaining countries was somewhat weakened by a currency union, the incentive of their 
governments to spend less in order to borrow cheaply should have been strengthened.    
3. In November 2011 the probability (implied from prices on the online betting market Intrade) that at least one country would leave the Euro 
area peaked at over 65% (Shambaugh, 2012). 
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particular, suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact in late 2003 encouraged borrowing in 
countries which had traditionally run large fiscal deficits. In turn, Weichenrieder and Zimmer 
(2013)  find that Euro area membership has weakened responsiveness of fiscal policy to the 
level of sovereign debt compared to the period prior to the euro adoption. However, they view 
their results as not robust enough to draw firm conclusions. Thus, further research is needed. 
We provide empirical evidence in favour of the third narrative, which provides at least three 
testable hypotheses. Firstly, perspective of joining and then membership in the Euro area 
subdued the importance of domestic factors in sovereign bond yields of peripheral countries. 
These factors regained their importance only after the fears of Euro area disintegration had 
spread. Secondly, peripheral countries run unsustainable fiscal policies before the global 
financial crisis. Their policies ceased to be sustainable not after adopting the Euro, but when 
their governments started gaining the windfall of low interest burden. Thirdly, during the 
period, when peripheral countries were gaining the windfall of low interest burden, the 
remaining countries strengthened their fiscal sustainability.     
There is ample evidence supporting the first hypothesis
4
, therefore, we focus on the 
remaining two. Our approach to study fiscal sustainability builds on the framework of fiscal 
reaction function proposed by Bohn (1998) and developed by many others, in particular de 
Mello (2005) and Mendoza and Ostry (2008). We use it in a form which controls for the 
possibility of spurious correlation, much like, inter alia, Afonso (2008), Afonso and Jalles 
(2011) or Medeiros (2012) have done. Following Favero and Marcellino (2005) and, in 
particular, Burger and Marinkov (2012), we apply the function not only to fiscal stance 
indicators, but also to major categories of government revenue and expenditure.     
We estimate fiscal reaction functions on a sample of 12 early member states of the Euro 
Area in the period of 1970-2013. We divide the sample into two groups based on the scale of 
benefits from sovereign bond yields’ convergence related to establishment of the Euro area5. 
The benefits also form the split of the analysed period into two sub-periods: the baseline time 
(covering the years of 1970-1995 and 2008-2013) and the time of the windfall for the 
peripheral member states (covering the years 1996-2007).  
Our main findings are as follows. Firstly, in the countries where sovereign bond yields 
decreased sharply in the years 1996-2007, fiscal stance ceased to respond to sovereign debt 
accumulation.  This was due to the lack of sufficient adjustment in government non-
                                                     
4. See, e.g. Afonso et al., 2012; Afonso et al., 2013; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2011; Aßmann and Boysen-Hogrefe, 2012; Attinasi et al., 
2009; Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012; Borgy et al., 2012; De Grauwe and Ji, 2012a and 2012b; De Santis, 2012; Gibson et al., 2012; Gerlach et 
al., 2010; von Hagen et al., 2011; or Haugh et al., 2009. 
5. Other reasons for such a division are specified in the section two. 
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investment expenditure and direct taxes. In contrast, in the member states which did not 
benefit from yields’ convergence related to the Euro area establishment, responsiveness of 
fiscal stance to sovereign debt increased during 1996-2007. It was achieved mainly through 
pronounced adjustments of government non-investment expenditure. The findings are robust 
to changes in estimation method, measure of fiscal stance, composition of the sample and 
definition of the windfall. 
The paper makes three main contributions to the literature.  
Firstly, while studying fiscal sustainability in the Euro area, the paper focuses on effects 
of the windfall gains from sovereign bond yields’ convergence in the peripheral countries. To 
the best of our knowledge, none of the previous studies on fiscal reaction functions in the 
Euro area pay as much attention as this paper does to the role of windfall.  
Secondly, due to such a focus, the paper contributes to relatively underdeveloped 
literature on the effects of windfall gains in advanced economies. Although the literature on 
windfall gains is broad and diverse, it is centred on developing countries. It has been focusing  
on natural resources (see, e.g. Mehlum et al., 2006), foreign aid (see, e.g. Svensson, 2000) or 
foreign borrowing (see, e.g. Vamvakidis, 2007). These sources of windfall are of no 
importance to the vast majority of advanced economies. Exceptions include e.g. resource 
abundant countries (like Norway), which have made good use of such kind of windfall (see, 
e.g. Gylafson, 2011). Obviously, the paper is not the first one to deal  with the effects of 
windfall on peripheral countries of the Euro area. It follows, e.g. Fernández-Villaverde et al. 
(2013), however only in very general terms. These authors, on the one hand, associate the 
windfall with the global financial bubble, rather than with sovereign bond yields’ 
convergence related to the Euro area establishment. On the other hand, they study general 
reform process in peripheral economies rather than fiscal policy. 
Thirdly, the paper studies links between fiscal adjustment composition and fiscal 
sustainability through the lens of fiscal reaction functions
6
. The main advantage of this 
approach is being able to avoid discretion in defining the notion of fiscal sustainability. The 
paper extends analyses by Favero and Marcellino (2005) and Burger and Marinkov (2012). 
The former studies reactions of total revenue and expenditure only, whereas the latter 
analyses South Africa rather than of the Euro area.  
The remainder of the paper is organized in five sections. Section two provides a bird’s 
eye view of the windfall in the peripheral economies resulting from the sovereign bond 
                                                     
6. Research on these links has intensified following the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area (see, e.g. Afonso and Jalles, 2012; Alesina and 
Ardagna, 2013; or Heylen et al., 2013). However, most papers generally approached the issue from different angles than the one which fiscal 
reaction functions allow for. 
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yields’ convergence related to establishment of the Euro area and how it was used. Section 
three presents  our estimation strategy. Section four provides estimation results of various 
fiscal reaction functions. Section five verifies the results’ robustness. Section six discusses 
policy implications. Section seven concludes. The appendix including figures and tables 
follows. 
II. A BIRD’S EYE VIEW OF THE EFFECTS OF WINDFALL FROM THE 
SOVEREIGN BOND YIELDS’ CONVERGENCE IN THE EURO AREA 
When the establishment of the Euro area was formally decided in the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992, there was a clear division across the EU with regard to sovereign bond yields. While in 
most EU countries they were very close to each other, spread against 10 year German bunds 
was ranging from 4 to 6 percentage points in Italy, Portugal and Spain. In Greece it was even 
exceeding 16 percentage points.  
We label these 4 countries as peripheral. Ireland, with the spread in excess of  
1 percentage point, hardly fits this group, however taking into account the yield path in the 
aftermath of the crisis, we included it among the peripheral countries (as most other studies do 
– see, e.g. Corsetti at al., 2014, Lane, 2012 or Shambaugh, 2012)7, 8.  
The spreads in peripheral countries started to narrow after December 1995, when details 
on euro adoption were agreed upon. During the subsequent 3 years, spreads dropped to about 
20 basis points, except for Greece, where the yields’ convergence took 2 years longer. 
Therefore, financial markets treated the peripheral countries like most economically stable 
core countries. The changes in spreads are examined in the Figure 1. 
*** Insert Figure 1 here *** 
Yields’ convergence contributed to a deep decline of interest payments on sovereign debt 
in peripheral countries. In 1996-1999 the decline ranged from 1.7% of GDP in Spain to 4.9% 
of GDP in Italy. By comparison, in core countries it ranged from 0.1% of GDP in 
Luxembourg to 1.6% of GDP in Belgium. Gains in terms of lower interest payments due to 
yields’ convergence were magnified in peripheral countries by larger sovereign debt levels 
                                                     
7. The first study applies sovereign CDS spread above 150 basis points as a formal criterion for delineation between peripheral countries and 
core countries. The remaining two studies do not specify criteria, but they also seem to base their division of Euro area on yield paths in the 
aftermath of the crisis.  
8. In the econometric analysis developed in section five we check robustness of the results to the exclusion of Ireland from peripheral 
economies. 
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compared to core countries. Although in 1996 the country with the largest net debt was 
Belgium, the next five most indebted EU states  belonged to peripheral countries.  
In 1999-2007 interest payments declined further. In both groups of countries the decline 
was similar and ranged from 0.1% – 3.0% of GDP. While in peripheral countries it was 
primarily due to rollover of maturing debt at lower yields, in the majority of core countries it 
was caused largely by a fall in sovereign debt level.  
Described yields’ convergence in peripheral countries resulted in negative interest rate 
growth differential (IRGD). While IRGD in the core countries became clearly negative only 
in 2006-2007, i.e. at the peak of the pre-crisis boom and during the early phase of subsequent 
flight-from-risk and flight-to-quality
9
, yields in peripheral countries fell below nominal GDP 
growth rate in 1996 and remained clearly below that rate until 2007 (see Figure 2)
10
.  
*** Insert Figure 2 here *** 
Negative IRGD is inconsistent with dynamic efficiency of an economy as it implies that 
larger spending today does not require lower future spending (see, e.g. Fischer and Easterly, 
1990). In case of fiscal policy, this means that, in theory, permanently negative IRGD 
prevents sovereign debt to GDP ratio from exploding notwithstanding primary deficit
11
. There 
where at least two reasons why negative IRGD in peripheral countries should be considered a 
windfall rather than permanent phenomena. Firstly, domestic saving rates in these countries 
have always been much lower than the capital share in GDP, indicating that they have been 
far from dynamic inefficiency. Secondly, there is plenty of empirical evidence confirming that 
country-specific credit and liquidity risk factors in yields of peripheral countries were 
dominated by the international factor. Therefore, the former factors were mispriced in the 
years preceding the global financial crisis
12
. After its outburst, when these factors started 
regaining their importance, the yields of peripheral countries soared
13
.  
                                                     
9. Flight-from-risk and flight-to-quality are provided as an explanation of the negative IRGD in the core countries by, e.g. Caporale and 
Girardi (2011). 
10. In this group only Italy which was struggling with slow GDP growth, did not benefit from negative IRGD. Lack of large external 
imbalances was another Italian peculiarity. Due to this peculiarity Italy is not included in peripheral countries in some studies (see, e.g. Kang 
and Shambaugh, 2014). In the econometric analysis we check robustness of our results to the change of Italy’s classification (i.e. shifting 
from peripheral to core countries).  
11. However, Ball et al. (1998) argue that attempt to roll over sovereign debt forever would fail in the case of negative shock to output 
growth. Such a shock would force government to impose higher taxation on generations already burdened by slow output growth. This is 
what apparently happened in the peripheral countries in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
12. See, e.g. Afonso et al., 2012; Barrios et al., 2009; Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012; De Grauwe and Ji, 2012a, 2012b; Haugh et al., 2009; or 
Laubach, 2011. 
13. See, e.g. Afonso et al., 2012; Afonso et al., 2013; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012; Aßmann and Boysen-Hogrefe, 2012; Attinasi et al., 
2009; Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012; Borgy et al., 2012; De Grauwe and Ji, 2012a, 2012b; De Santis, 2012; Gerlach et al., 2010; Gibson et al., 
2012; von Hagen et al., 2011; or Haugh et al., 2009. 
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Despite the arguments mentioned above, fiscal policy in peripheral countries had been 
run as if IRGD was to be permanently negative. We present a justification of this thesis in the 
following paragraphs. 
The period prior to  introducing the Euro is commonly hailed as one of a successful fiscal 
consolidations, which even resulted in a “consolidation fatigue” after the Euro area 
establishment (see, e.g. Briotti, 2004 or Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2013). In 1996-1999 
fiscal balance indeed improved considerably. However, in peripheral countries almost 80% of 
this improvement was due to decline of interest payments
14
 and the remaining part due to 
cyclical factors. It was accompanied by increases in non-interest spending (sometimes very 
large, e.g. Greece and Portugal), but their impact on fiscal stance was muted or even offset by 
tax increases. In core countries in 1996-1999 fiscal balance improved much less than in 
peripheral countries. In contrast to the one in peripheral countries, its improvement did not 
result exclusively from the decline of interest payments, nor from cyclical factors but also 
from cuts in non-interest spending. Changes of the main fiscal categories in peripheral and 
core countries in 1996-1999 are compared in the Figure 3. 
*** Insert Figure 3 here *** 
In 1999-2007 fiscal policy was expansionary in both peripheral and core countries. 
However, both groups of countries substantially differed in terms of the size and composition 
of fiscal expansion. In peripheral countries fiscal balance worsened in spite of a decline in 
interest payments and booming economy. This worsening resulted from very large increases 
in non-interest spending. In every peripheral country they exceeded 2% of GDP in cyclically 
adjusted terms (and in Greece and Ireland – even 5% of GDP). Unlike in 1996-1999, their 
impact on fiscal stance was not seriously alleviated by tax increases, except for Portugal and 
Spain. In core countries the worsening of cyclically adjusted primary balance was not large 
enough to outweigh the decline of interest payments and the positive effects of automatic 
stabilizers on fiscal balance. Besides, it resulted from tax reductions (sometimes very large, in 
particular in Austria, Germany and Luxembourg), while non-interest spending was usually 
cut. It is also worth noting that the worsening reflected countercyclical fiscal stimulus after 
the burst of the dotcom bubble, which was largely withdrawn in the subsequent years. That 
said, fiscal profligacy in large core economies early after the Euro area establishment, led to 
the suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2003 and its’ watering-down in 2005. 
                                                     
14. This is probably why e.g. Briotti (2004) find that the more indebted the country was, the deeper the fiscal consolidation it undertook 
before the euro adoption. 
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Changes of the main fiscal categories in peripheral and core countries in 1999-2007 are 
shown in Figure 4.        
*** Insert Figure 4 here *** 
 As the majority of peripheral countries increased their non-interest spending in 1996-
2007 by more than they saved on interest payments, they entered the global financial crisis 
with cyclically adjusted primary balance in the red. Italy was the only exception to that rule. 
By comparison, among core countries only France had sovereign debt on an unsustainable 
path at the time. Still worse, although peripheral countries lacked fiscal space, most of them 
introduced large fiscal stimuli in response to the outburst of the crisis. As a result, when the 
yields diverged in 2010-2012, all peripheral countries experienced solvency problems. They 
either accepted assistance from the EU bailout mechanisms: European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) or European Stability Mechanism (ESM) (Ireland, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain), or were major beneficiaries of unconventional monetary policy measures undertaken 
by the European Central Bank (ECB), which included bond purchase programs (Italy and 
Spain). These problems forced the peripheral countries to introduce large fiscal consolidations 
in 2010-2013. Nevertheless, their cyclically adjusted primary balance had remained worse 
than in core countries, even though due to higher yields they would need better primary 
balance (or faster growth) than the core countries to achieve fiscal sustainability. 
The July 2012 declaration by Mario Draghi, the President of the ECB, to do “whatever 
it takes to preserve the euro” and the announcement of Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMT) in September 2012 has been followed by yields’ re-convergence15 (even though the 
OMT framework has not been used so far to make any bond purchase). The effects of this re-
convergence on fiscal sustainability in the peripheral countries remains to be seen. 
III. ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
The narrative analysis from the previous section suggests three hypotheses concerning 
differences in the effects of yields’ convergence on fiscal sustainability across the Euro area 
countries:  
                                                     
15. Although many observers credit these events for the falling sovereign spreads in peripheral countries (see, e.g. Corsetti et al., 2014), other 
researchers argue that it was rather related to a reduction in external imbalances in countries in question (see, e.g. Gros, 2013). Some other 
observers (in particular, Steikamp and Westermann, 2014) go even further in their skepticism, as the ECB has a status of senior lender and 
they find evidence that the share of senior lenders in the total sovereign debt increases sovereign bond yields. 
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Hypothesis A: peripheral countries were running unsustainable fiscal policies, when they 
were receiving the windfall from yields’ convergence;  
Hypothesis B: at that time, the core countries have strengthened their fiscal 
sustainability; 
Hypothesis C: these distinction has been mirrored mainly in differences between core 
and peripheral countries in terms of non-interest expenditure changes during the windfall 
period. 
The hypotheses are in line with the explanation of the European sovereign debt crisis by 
Aguiar et al. (2014) presented in the introduction to the paper. In the next two sections we 
verify the hypotheses econometrically, based on heterogeneous fiscal reaction functions.    
The literature on fiscal reaction functions has been fast growing in recent years. On the 
theoretical ground, the new impulse to its development was given, in particular, by Bohn 
(2007), who argued against reliability of unit root and cointegration tests in evaluating fiscal 
sustainability. On empirical ground, this impulse was given by the global financial crisis, 
followed by serious fiscal tensions in various parts of the world, especially in the Euro area 
(see, e.g. Baldi and Staehr, 2013; Baskaran and Hessami, 2013; European Commission, 2011; 
Medeiros, 2012 or Weichenrieder and Zimmer, 2013). 
Fiscal reaction functions are derived from the budget identity (see in particular the 
seminal paper by Bohn, 1998):  
   (    )           (1) 
where D stands for the sovereign debt, i for the nominal interest rate on sovereign debt and 
PB for the primary balance.  
After shifting to GDP ratios, the budget identity implies that a change in public debt yields: 
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Equation (3) allows the estimation of the simplest fiscal reaction function: 
(
  
 
)
 
     (
 
 
)
   
     
(4) 
Given that in a dynamically efficient economy, an inequality:   >   should hold16, fiscal 
sustainability requires a statistically significant and positive  . 
 Empirical fiscal reaction functions usually include also output gap and government 
expenditure gap to control for effects of cyclical fluctuations (see, e.g. Bohn, 1998), lag of 
primary balance to allow for policy inertia (see, e.g. de Mello, 2005) or current account 
balance to control for the “twin deficits” effect (Mendoza and Ostry , 2008 or European 
Commission, 2011). In  the first step of econometric analysis we start with the same 
specification as European Commission (2011): 
                                                                                 (5) 
where    is country effect,          is the primary balance,      is the sovereign debt,      is 
the output gap,      is the cyclical component of government final consumption expenditure, 
    is the current account balance17. We modify the specification in order to take into account 
nonstationarity of the variables: according to Maddala and Wu (1999) and Pesaran (2007) 
stationarity tests (results are presented in Table 1) only      and      vriables are 
stationary
18
. The final specification of fiscal reaction function (hereafter: Model 1) is 
therefore: 
                                                                               (6) 
*** Insert Table 1 here *** 
We estimate equation (6) for 9 subsamples as specified in Table 2. As indicated in the 
previous sections, the subsamples are created based on the scale of benefits from sovereign 
                                                     
16. At least in the long term, to which the notion of fiscal sustainability applies. Nevertheless, as already mentioned, Ball et al. (1998) 
provide some reservations to this claim with regard to sovereign bond yields. 
17. Unlike Bohn (1998) and like European Commission (2011) and Mendoza and Ostry (2008) equation (5) does not include quadratic and 
the cubic sovereign debt to control for possible non-linearity in the responsiveness of primary balance. It is worth noting that their inclusion 
in other studies gave results which are hardly robust. On the one hand, Bohn (1998) found that in the United States larger sovereign debt led 
to stronger responsiveness of primary balance. IMF (2003), using debt-threshold dummies, confirms this result for industrialized countries. 
Afonso (2008) finds an increasing responsiveness of primary balance to sovereign debt in the EU-15. On the other hand, the opposite effect 
is found by Calasun et al. (2007) and the IMF (2003) for the developing countries and by Ghosh et al. (2013) and Medeiros (2012) for the 
industrialized economies and EU-15 respectively. 
18. We are aware that the results of both tests may be biased. Maddala and Wu test assumes lack of cross-section dependence, which is 
actually the case for all analyzed variable but is most suitable for short and fixed time dimension as in our sample (Hoang and McNown, 
2006). On the other hand, Pesaran test assumes cross-section dependence but T tending to infinity. Unfortunately, to our best knowledge 
there is no test which addresses both of the shortcomings simultaneously. 
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bond yields’ convergence related to establishment of the Euro area.  Given that these 
definitions require some discretion, as part of robustness analysis, we re-estimate the model 
under alternative composition of both groups of countries, and different splits of the analysed 
period (for more on the robustness analysis, see section five).  
*** Insert Table 2 here *** 
In order to verify Hypotheses A and B, we compare lagged debt estimates 
(  ) between windfall and baseline period for peripheral and core countries. If the estimate 
for peripheral countries, based on windfall subsample, is statistically non-significant or 
significantly lower than the same parameter for baseline subsample, it will support 
Hypothesis A. By the same token for core countries, statistically significant positive    for 
windfall subsample higher than baseline subsample would support Hypothesis B.  
In the second step we estimate responsiveness of major categories of government 
revenue and expenditure to changes in sovereign debt. Recall that as indicated in Hypothesis 
C the divergence in fiscal sustainability between peripheral and core countries was mostly 
driven by different paths of government non-interest spending. We estimate separate fiscal 
reaction functions for (a) direct tax revenue (      ),  (b) indirect tax revenue (      ), (c) 
investment expenditure (      ) and (d) non-investment expenditure (       )19. For each of 
the variables we use specification presented in (6) e.g.  
                                                                                 (7) 
and each equation (hereafter: Model 2 - 5, respectively) has been estimated for 9 subsamples, 
which gives us 36 estimates of   . Direct comparison of   values for different subsamples 
and revenue or expenditure categories allows us to verify Hypothesis C. 
Definitions of all variables used in the estimates and their data sources are presented in 
Table 3. The majority of data are sourced from the AMECO database. Data on primary 
balance for Ireland and Spain is obtained from the IMF WEO and the data on sovereign bond 
yields – from the Eurostat. Descriptive statistics follow in Table 4. 
*** Insert Table 3 here *** 
*** Insert Table 4 here *** 
                                                     
19. This part of econometric analysis follows Favero and Marcellino (2005) and Burger and Marinkov (2012). The former paper uses the 
fiscal reaction function framework for the government revenue and expenditure, while the latter applies it to specific categories of taxes and 
government expenditure. 
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We estimate the above equations using a set of panel data estimators. We begin with 
fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) estimators, which assumes homogeneous 
coefficients of the explanatory variables but allow for a different constant term for particular 
countries. The results, based on the estimators mentioned, may be biased due to several 
methodological problems. The first one is a possible cross-section dependence (or spatial 
correlation) of error terms. In the analyzed model, this is equivalent to the assumption that 
there are unobserved time-varying omitted variables common for all countries, which impact 
individual states. Actually, the results of the Pesaran’s test for cross-section dependence 
indicate that this is a characteristic of the data set used (but not necessarily of particular 
subsamples). If these unobservable common factors are uncorrelated with the independent 
variables, the coefficient estimates based on FE and RE regression are consistent, but standard 
errors estimates are biased. Therefore, we use the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) nonparametric 
covariance matrix estimator (DK) which corrects for the error structure spatial dependence. 
This estimator also addresses the second problem, namely standard errors bias due to potential 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the error terms. The third problem results from the 
fact that the estimated equations are dynamic, so standard panel data estimators, such as fixed 
effects (FE) and random effects (RE) are biased. One approach to addressing this problem is 
to apply an instrumental variable estimator, such as that proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) or Arellano and Bover (1995). These estimators are asymptotically consistent, but their 
properties are unsatisfactory in the case of short samples. As Kiviet (1995) notes, it is possible 
to correct the bias of the standard estimators  without affecting their efficiency. In this article, 
we apply a corrected least square dummy variable estimator (LSDVC) proposed by Bun and 
Kiviet (2002) and modified for the analysis of the unbalanced panels by Bruno (2005). 
Taking into account all of the above restrictions, we use four types of panel data 
estimators: fixed effects (FE), random effects (RE), Driscoll-Kraay (DK) and corrected least 
square dummy variable estimator (LSDVC). That said, we are fully aware that our results 
ought to be viewed with caution – at the very least due to estimation problems typical for 
panel datasets with as short time dimension as in some of our subsamples. 
IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
We start the econometric analysis with verification of Hypotheses A and B put forward in 
section three, on the basis of the theoretical model by Aguiar et al. (2014).  To this aim we 
13 
 
estimate Model 1 for each of nine subsamples defined in Table 2 using four different 
estimators. Table 5 provides results for the whole EU-12 sample with estimators and time 
periods grouped in the particular columns. These models cover the largest data panel with up 
to 402 observations, however they also conceal any heterogeneity within the EU-12. Lagged 
public debt coefficients for all periods and estimators are positive and statistically significant 
indicating that governments area-wide reduce fiscal deficits when faced with increases in debt 
levels. In FE, DK and LSDVC estimators, reaction appears actually stronger during the 
windfall period than the baseline. As the core country group dominates the EU-12 sample, 
this may be attributed to its’ fiscal consolidations during the pre-accession period, which were 
indicated by descriptive investigation in section three. 
*** Insert Table 5 here *** 
Tables 6 and Tables 7 show estimates for core and peripheral country groups respectively. 
Results yield the primary support for Hypotheses A and B: 
1. Estimates of ∆debtt-1 are positive and statistically significant in all cases except for the 
windfall period in the peripheral country group, where it loses statistical significance 
for the FE, RE and LSDVC estimators
20
. It thus appears, that fiscal policy in 
peripheral countries ceases to react to changes in sovereign debt during the windfall 
years in accordance with Hypothesis A.  
2. As further indicated by the coefficients of the ∆debtt-1 variable, fiscal positions of the 
core member states react much more strongly to the levels of debt in the windfall 
period than the baseline, with respective coefficients, amounted to 0.260-0.438 for the 
former and 0.132-0.138  for the latter period (depending on the estimator used). The 
results support Hypothesis B, which indicates that during windfall period core 
countries, as opposed to peripheral ones, have strengthened their fiscal sustainability.  
The result, which demands further elaboration, is the stronger reaction of fiscal balance to 
sovereign debt in peripheral than core countries during the baseline period (estimates of 
0.172-0.178 compared to 0.132-0.138). We see two plausible and non-exclusive explanations 
for such results. First, the European sovereign debt crisis is part of the baseline period. This 
may be unfortunate, but we cannot afford to leave it out, considering the limited size of our 
sample. The peripheral member states, due to their dire fiscal positions, were required to 
conduct stronger fiscal consolidations during this period than the core countries. Second, 
                                                     
20. 5% significance of the estimate obtained using DK estimator for windfall period in peripheral countries is rather spurious: the results of 
Pesaran’s and Frees’ tests shown in the table indicate cross-section independence in this particular subsample. Utilizing the DK estimator in 
this case may yield biased estimates, as the ideas of the estimator is to correct standard errors for the presence of cross-section dependence. 
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Afonso (2008) found stronger responsiveness of fiscal policy at higher debt levels in the EU-
15 data during the 1970-2003 period. Mean consolidated gross debt in our sample is greater 
for the periphery than core country group in every single year, perhaps explaining the 
different responsiveness during the baseline period. 
*** Insert Table 6 here *** 
*** Insert Table 7 here *** 
In the next step we estimate Model 2 – Model 5, i.e. fiscal reaction functions for tax 
and spending categories, which allow to verify Hypothesis C. Results are presented in Table 
8 in panels A-D respectively.
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*** Insert Table 8 here *** 
First, in panel A (Model 2), we estimate a reaction function for direct taxes. Results 
indicate that direct taxes were an adjustment instrument only during the baseline period in the 
peripheral countries, which responded with tax increases to higher debt levels. In the 
remaining subsamples the estimates are not significant.  
Second, in panel B (Model 3), the reaction function is based on indirect taxes. In general, 
it appears that peripheral countries have been increasing the indirect taxes in response to 
rising debt in both periods, with stronger and more statistically significant estimates for the 
windfall years. In the core member states rising debt coincided with opposite response in 
indirect taxes, however the estimates are statistically significant only for the whole sample. 
Third, in panel C (Model 4), an expenditure reaction function with investment expenditure 
is estimated. It follows from results that both, core and periphery groups, used investment 
spending as an adjustment mechanism to changing debt levels during the baseline timespan. 
The adjustment has been significantly stronger for the periphery than core group (estimates of 
-0.28 and -0.22 respectively).  Both groups of countries did not use investment expenditure to 
adjust to debt level during windfall years.  
Fourth, in panel D (Model 5), non-investment expenditure reaction function is estimated. 
In this case, results signal that non-investment expenditure has been an adjustment 
mechanism in the baseline period for both core and peripheral member states, with stronger 
and more statistically significant results for the core group. However, during the windfall 
                                                     
21. For the sake of brevity we restrict presentation of the results to lagged debt estimates only. Remaining estimates are available upon 
request. 
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timespan, results indicate even more substantial changes in reaction to debt fluctuations than 
during baseline years in the core group, while lack of statistically significant relationship for 
peripheral countries. 
Recoupling the results give strong support to Hypothesis C:  
1. During the baseline period, peripheral countries reacted to rising levels of debt 
with cuts in both non-investment and investment expenditure. However, in the 
windfall years, the fiscal stances of the peripheral member states ceased to react to 
growing debt with expenditure cuts and increases in direct taxes, but instead 
moved to rise the indirect taxes. As tax-based fiscal consolidations are typically 
less likely to reduce debt-to-GDP ratios (Alesina and Ardagna, 2013), our results 
give further credence to Hypothesis A. 
2. The core member states in the baseline years responded to deteriorations in fiscal 
position with non-investment spending cuts and much smaller decreases in 
investment expenditure. In the windfall period, the core countries moved to 
strengthen their fiscal stances with much stronger non-investment expenditure 
consolidations than during the baseline period. This finding lends also further 
support for Hypothesis B.  
V. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
In this section we examine if the results are robust to various changes in modelling approach. 
All regressions presented in this section are carried out with fixed effects estimator, as 
previously there were no major differences between the various estimation methods
22
. 
In part I and II of the analysis we check if the results are sensitive to the way, in which 
cyclical factors are controlled for in the model. To this end, in Model 1 primary balance is 
exchanged for the cyclically adjusted primary balance as the dependent variable and lagged 
explanatory variable, while output gap is removed from explanatory variables. In part I, we 
utilize the cyclically adjusted primary balance based on trend GDP
23
 and show results in 
Table 9. As in our primary results, the ∆debtt-1 coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant across all timespans and country groups, except for the windfall period in the 
peripheral member states, where it lacks statistical significance. The strength of 
responsiveness is similar to previous results. Subsequently, in part II, we utilize the cyclically 
                                                     
22. Results for other estimators are available on demand and they do not change our conclusions. 
23. Trend GDP is calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (European Commission, 2014; European Commission, 2000). 
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adjusted primary balance based on potential GDP
24
 instead of trend GDP. Results are 
presented in Table 10. As previously, the ∆debtt-1 coefficient is positive and significant, 
except the periphery sample during the windfall period. 
*** Insert Table 9 here *** 
*** Insert Table10 here *** 
In part III we check whether our results are robust to excluding any single country 
from our sample. Debt coefficients with their standard errors and significance levels from this 
procedure are summarized in Table 11. Results for other estimators are available on demand 
and they do not change our conclusions. When Belgium or Finland are excluded from the core 
sample, statistical significance of fiscal responses during the baseline period is lost for the 
core countries. However, the strength of the response remains similar and increased during 
the windfall years and whole sample in the core country group. On the other hand, exclusion 
of Greece from the periphery sample alters results in terms of both response strength and 
statistical significance during all years and baseline periods in the periphery. There is not 
much change in the all years EU-12 sample.  
*** Insert Table 11 here *** 
Subsequently, in part IV we alter the composition of the core and periphery groups. 
The aim is to investigate the results when the periphery group is defined as the countries with 
negative interest rate-growth differentials during the windfall period. This results in moving 
Italy from the periphery to core country group. The outcome is presented in Table 12 and 
does not alter our previous conclusions.  
*** Insert Table 12 here *** 
Finally, in part V we change the composition of baseline and windfall timespans. The 
windfall period is now defined as pre-crisis Euro area membership years
25
. Estimates are 
presented in Table 13 and remain similar as previously, however the lagged debt coefficient 
loses statistical significance during the baseline period in core countries. It is difficult to 
account for this, nevertheless the result of a statistically insignificant response during the 
                                                     
24. Potential GDP is calculated based on a TFP adjusted Cobb-Douglas production function approach (European Commission, 2014; Denis 
et al., 2002). 
25. 2001-2007 for Greece and 1999-2007 for all other countries. 
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windfall period in the periphery remains valid (Hypothesis A) along with high fiscal policy 
responsiveness in core countries during the windfall years (Hypothesis B). 
*** Insert Table 13 here *** 
In conclusion, the results are robust not only to the choice of different estimators (as 
shown in the previous section), but also to the changes of the dependent variable (parts I and 
II), exclusions of countries from the sample (part III), changes in country groups definitions 
(part IV) and alternative time periods definitions (part V). Relatively small deviations are 
present in the robustness analysis, however they are to be expected due to the small size of 
our sample. 
VI. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
As mentioned in the introduction to the paper, studies analyzing fiscal sustainability in the 
Euro area through the lens of fiscal reaction functions are hardly conclusive (cf. Baldi and 
Staehr, 2013; Baskaran and Hessami, 2013; European Commission, 2011; Medeiros, 2012; 
Weichenrieder and Zimmer, 2013). Our results are in line with these studies, which find 
different reaction functions, for the pre-crisis period, in the peripheral countries, compared to 
the core ones. We find the evidence that many similar studies fail to establish (see, e.g. Baldi 
and Staehr, 2013 or Weichenrieder and Zimmer, 2013), possibly because we put stress on 
windfall gained by the peripheral countries from the yields’ convergence, while these studies 
usually focus either on establishment of the Euro area or on Euro adoption by peripheral 
countries. It is worth noting that studies on fiscal reaction functions for Japan, which since 
1990’s has been gaining  a windfall of low interest burden due to unconventional monetary 
policy measures, reach similar conclusions to ours (see, e.g. Doi et al., 2011; Ito et al., 2011; 
Mauro et al., 2013 or Sakuragawa and Hosono, 2011). 
Another main finding appears to be much less controversial. There is ample evidence that 
the composition of fiscal adjustments matters for fiscal sustainability (see, e.g. Afonso et al., 
2005; Afonso and Jalles, 2012; Alesina and Ardagna, 2013, 2010 or 1998; Alesina and 
Perotti, 1996; Alesina et al., 1998; Baldacci et al., 2010; von Hagen et al., 2002; von Hagen 
and Strauch, 2001; Heylen et al., 2013; McDermott and Wescott, 1996; Purfield, 2003 or 
Tsibouris et al., 2006). Our results suggest that this evidence also holds when one avoids 
discretion in defining the notion of fiscal sustainability and instead refers to the budget 
identity. 
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If these findings were correct, then they would have far reaching implications for 
appropriate policy. They suggest that any actions which supress significance of country 
specific credit risk in sovereign bonds’ prices, sow the seeds of a new crisis, given inherent 
government’s temptation not to save a windfall of low interest burden. Paradoxically, the 
more reason there is in the claims that the Euro area members are susceptible to similar risk to 
the one faced by countries forced to issue debt in foreign currency (see, e.g. De Grauwe and 
Ji, 2012a or 2012b), the greater the threat such actions cause. They widen the ranges of deficit 
and debt levels, within which market does not act as a deterrent against unsustainable fiscal 
policy. There is little chance that a government would not fully exploit this broader 
opportunity to run unsustainable fiscal policy. The longer the market reactions are muted, the 
more seriously the market may overreact (cf. Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009). Our findings 
would also contribute to the on-going debate on “austerity”26. Namely, they suggest that the 
peripheral countries have largely exhausted fiscal space during the pre-crisis period and have 
had no choice but to struggle for restoring it thereafter. They suggest also that to make public 
finances sustainable these countries should have adjusted mainly non-investment government 
spending, rather than relied on tax increases or cuts in investment outlays. 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We estimate various fiscal reaction functions for the 12 Euro area member states during the 
1970-2013 period.  
This allows us, firstly, to test two hypotheses which are implied by the explanation of the 
European sovereign debt crisis provided by the theoretical model by Aguiar et al. (2014). We 
find that the peripheral countries, in which sovereign bond yields fell deeply in the years 
1996-2007, were running unsustainable fiscal policies. In contrast, in core countries which did 
not benefit from yields’ convergence related to the Euro area establishment, fiscal 
sustainability was strengthened during 1996-2007. These findings are robust to various 
changes in modelling approach. They suggest that windfall gains are perilous not only for 
developing countries but are likely to cause severe fiscal tensions even in advanced 
economies. 
Secondly, fiscal reaction functions that we estimate provide a new type of evidence that 
the composition of fiscal innovations matters for fiscal sustainability. We find that 
unsustainable fiscal policy in the peripheral countries during 1996-2007 resulted from lack of 
                                                     
26. It is surveyed, e.g. by Balcerowicz et al. (2013). 
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sufficient adjustment in government non-investment expenditure and direct taxes. In contrast, 
the strengthened fiscal sustainability in the core countries at the time was mainly related to 
pronounced adjustments of government non-investment expenditure. 
We find our contributions both timely and policy relevant. That said, we are fully aware 
that our results ought to be viewed with caution – at the very least due to estimation problems 
typical for panel datasets with a short time dimension. 
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APPENDIX 
FIGURE 1. Government bond spreads against Germany (percentage points) 
 
Note: German long-term government bond yields have been subtracted from values for every single country (including 
Germany) and then averaged. Further information on the source and computation method are given in Table 3. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Interest rate-growth differential (percentage points) 
 
Note: Interest rate growth differential is defined as the differential between the cost of debt and growth rate of nominal GDP. 
Effective interest rate on sovereign debt is approximated by the ratio of government interest payments to sovereign debt. The 
same approximation is used, e.g. by Favero and Monacelli (2005). Further information on the source and computation 
method are given in Table 3. 
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FIGURE 3. Change in main fiscal categories. EU-12 core and peripherial countries from 1996 to 1999 (percentage points 
of GDP) 
 
Note: 1996 values have been subtracted from 1999. All variables are cyclically adjusted based on potential GDP. 
Appraisal of fiscal policy in the EU-12 core and periphery does not change when analysis is based on values cyclically 
adjusted with trend GDP or without any cyclical adjustment. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4. Change in main fiscal categories. EU-12 core and peripherial countries from 1999 to 2007 (percentage points 
of GDP) 
 
Note: 1999 values have been subtracted from 2007. All variables are cyclically adjusted based on potential GDP. 
Appraisal of fiscal policy in the EU-12 core and periphery does not change when analysis is based on values cyclically 
adjusted with trend GDP or without any cyclical adjustment.
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TABLE 1. Panel unit root tests 
        Variables 
Test 
Levels/first 
differences Trend Lags pbalance debt ogap ggap cab dirtax indtax invexp consexp capb_p capb_t 
M
ad
d
ala an
d
 W
u
 1
9
9
9
 
                            
Levels No 0 59.921*** 59.922 59.923*** 59.924*** 59.925* 59.93*** 59.931 59.928* 59.929* 59.926*** 59.927*** 
Levels No 1 65.777*** 13.37 122.474*** 238.083*** 40.287** 51.167*** 50.148*** 38.875** 37.148** 56.211*** 48.528*** 
Levels No 2 44.054*** 16.209 80.265*** 152.563*** 36.782** 41.184** 37.676** 28.354 26.586 37.199** 33.115 
Levels No 3 37.749** 20.535 88.567*** 136.497*** 32.39 32.524 31.759 21.196 31.281 33.535* 34.464* 
Levels Yes 0 41.555** 4.701 52.117*** 98.104*** 30.297 40.368** 29.155 26.751 30.123 51.964*** 42.279** 
Levels Yes 1 49.048*** 25.6 96.433*** 181.411*** 40.257** 47.951*** 45.909*** 24.51 43.655*** 43.509*** 35.698* 
Levels Yes 2 31.906 22.097 57.482*** 106.593*** 46.461*** 44.174*** 32.092 11.463 24.527 28.828 25.27 
Levels Yes 3 27.608 29.546 65.579*** 94.899*** 41.744** 30.386 36.064* 10.133 26.652 24.103 23.475 
Dif. No 0 366.968*** 142.495*** 366.065*** 406.849*** 443.984*** 320.868*** 326.985*** 329.609*** 316.286*** 430.71*** 413.737*** 
Dif. No 1 234.341*** 96.154*** 323.642*** 393.783*** 233.938*** 182.921*** 208.067*** 214.295*** 196.024*** 235.124*** 213.741*** 
Dif. No 2 149.736*** 68.287*** 198.492*** 290.253*** 145.134*** 135.126*** 143.485*** 129.157*** 127.054*** 147.906*** 130.172*** 
Dif. No 3 106.919*** 66.546*** 196.633*** 219.695*** 152.133*** 108.106*** 122.929*** 89.3*** 83.483*** 97.506*** 82.099*** 
Dif. Yes 0 306.723*** 126.428*** 301.847*** 333.403*** 377.686*** 258.77*** 274.634*** 281.44*** 262.52*** 354.767*** 341.076*** 
Dif. Yes 1 190.585*** 72.525*** 261.715*** 322.512*** 189.42*** 133.273*** 167.65*** 180.794*** 154.237*** 179.872*** 160.69*** 
Dif. Yes 2 116.551*** 51.05*** 148.548*** 228.114*** 110.224*** 91.043*** 109.89*** 104.227*** 103.558*** 108.147*** 92.256*** 
Dif. Yes 3 83.811*** 51.692*** 156.09*** 162.463*** 111.482*** 71.532*** 90.938*** 72.309*** 70.117*** 69.912*** 55.038*** 
P
esaran
 (2
0
0
7
) 
              
Levels No 0 -3.087*** 3.449 -4.275*** -6.837*** -0.385 -2.496*** -1.162 -0.67 -0.581 -3.748*** -3.345*** 
Levels No 1 -2.322** 1.321 -4.342*** -7.279*** -0.501 -1.825** -1.169 0.13 0.348 -2.334** -2.221** 
Levels No 2 -1.382* 0.865 -2.676*** -6.241*** -0.006 0.078 -0.202 0.917 1.502 -0.966 -0.601 
Levels No 3 -0.645 0.44 -2.785*** -4.673*** 0.303 -0.285 -0.467 1.351 1.764 -0.525 -0.311 
Levels Yes 0 -2.102** 6.128 -3.057*** -4.883*** 0.364 -2.151** -0.501 0.232 -0.049 -3.079*** -2.704*** 
Levels Yes 1 -0.868 3.204 -3.202*** -5.364*** -0.132 -1.992** -0.804 1.577 1.122 -0.907 -0.602 
Levels Yes 2 0.016 3.642 -1.515* -4.345*** -0.326 -0.583 0.744 2.459 1.659 0.681 1.279 
Levels Yes 3 0.042 4.015 -1.895** -2.435*** 0.104 -1.171 0.749 3.041 1.358 1.01 1.515 
Dif. No 0 -13.352*** -8.722*** -13.624*** -14.336*** -14.917*** -13.388*** -13.252*** -12.679*** -13.302*** -14.147*** -13.903*** 
Dif. No 1 -9.263*** -4.037*** -11.648*** -11.788*** -10.16*** -9.022*** -9.676*** -7.088*** -7.66*** -10.012*** -9.945*** 
Dif. No 2 -5.831*** -1.908** -8.004*** -8.747*** -6.588*** -5.983*** -5.292*** -3.786*** -4.017*** -5.633*** -5.477*** 
Dif. No 3 -3.113*** -0.879 -8.162*** -7.659*** -4.826*** -4.801*** -3.695*** -1.355* -1.633* -2.914*** -2.481*** 
Dif. Yes 0 -12.672*** -8.056*** -12.788*** -13.297*** -14.119*** -12.101*** -12.123*** -11.549*** -13.166*** -13.071*** -12.906*** 
Dif. Yes 1 -8.547*** -3.704*** -10.198*** -10.251*** -8.703*** -7.245*** -8.255*** -5.719*** -6.418*** -8.344*** -8.131*** 
Dif. Yes 2 -5.021*** -1.595* -6.431*** -6.866*** -5.012*** -4.378*** -3.661*** -2.425*** -2.891*** -4.095*** -3.753*** 
Dif. Yes 3 -2.064** -1.111 -7.182*** -5.596*** -3.066*** -3.523*** -1.418* 0.096 -0.86 -1.496* -1.003 
Notes: The first test is Maddala and Wu (1999) panel unit root test. Results shown are chi-square statistics. The second test is a Pesaran (2007) Panel Unit Root Test (CIPS). Results are Zt-bars. 
Stars denote stationarity at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) levels. 
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TABLE 2. Number of observations by country group and period 
Group of countries 
All years 
1970-2013 
Baseline 
1970-1995 & 2008-2013 
Windfall 
1996-2007 
Core  
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands) 
250 166 84 
Periphery  
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) 
152 92 60 
EU-12  
(all of the above) 
402 258 144 
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TABLE 3. Variable definitions 
Variable 
Name in 
models 
Unit Definition Source 
Primary balance pbalance % GDP 
Primary balance of general government. Note that data is sourced from AMECO, however gaps 
for Ireland (1980-1984) and Spain (1980-1994) are completed with WEO data. 
EC AMECO, IMF WEO 
Debt debt % GDP Consolidated gross debt of general government. EC AMECO  
Output gap ogap % GDP Gap between actual GDP and potential GDP. EC AMECO 
Cyclical component of government final 
consumption expenditure 
ggap % GDP 
Cyclical component of final consumption expenditure of general government, constructed by 
detrending the final government consumption expenditure as a share of GDP with the Hodrick-
Prescott filter (smoothing parameter set at 100). 
Authors' calculations 
based on EC AMECO 
Current account balance cab % GDP Current account balance. EC AMECO 
Cyclically adjusted primary balance 
(trend GDP) 
capb_p % GDP Cyclically adjusted primary balance based on potential GDP. EC AMECO 
Cyclically adjusted primary balance 
(potential GDP) 
capb_t % GDP Cyclically adjusted primary balance based on trend GDP. EC AMECO 
Indirect taxes indtax % GDP Taxes linked to imports and production. EC AMECO 
Direct taxes dirtax % GDP Current taxes on income and wealth. EC AMECO 
Investment expenditure invexp % GDP Gross fixed capital formation of general government. EC AMECO 
Non-investment expenditure consexp % GDP Total expenditure of general government excluding interest and gross fixed capital formation. 
Authors' calculations 
based on EC AMECO 
Cyclically adjusted budget balance  NA % GDP Cyclically adjusted budget balance of general government based on potential GDP. EC AMECO 
Cyclically adjusted revenue NA % GDP Cyclically adjusted revenue of general government based on potential GDP. EC AMECO 
Cyclically adjusted non-interest 
expenditure  
NA % GDP Cyclically adjusted non-interest expenditure of general government based on potential GDP. EC AMECO 
Cyclically adjusted interest payments NA % GDP Cyclically adjusted interest payments of general government based on potential GDP. 
Authors' calculations 
based on EC AMECO 
Interest-rate-growth differential NA 
Percentage 
points 
Differential between the cost of debt (computed by dividing interest payments in ECU/EUR by 
consolidated gross debt of general government in ECU/EUR) and growth rate of nominal GDP.  
Authors' calculations 
based on EC AMECO 
Bond spreads against Germany NA 
Percentage 
points 
Long-term government bond spreads against Germany based on EMU convergence criterion 
bond yields. German bond yields have been subtracted from values for every single country 
(including Germany) and then averaged. Yearly values have been aggregated from monthly 
data. 
Authors' calculations 
based on Eurostat 
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TABLE 4. Descriptive statistics 
      All years   Baseline   Windfall 
      1970-2013   1970-1995 & 2008-2013   1996-2007 
  
Name in 
models Unit Obs Mean SD Min Max   Obs Mean SD Min Max   Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Primary balance pbalance % GDP 433 0.55 3.19 -11.6 9.81   289 -0.29 3.16 -11.64 8.33   144 2.25 2.50 -3.97 9.81 
Debt debt % GDP 513 56.51 33.76 4.05 175.05   369 53.73 34.95 4.05 175.05   144 63.65 29.43 6.07 127.15 
Output gap ogap 
% potential 
GDP 
515 -0.01 2.51 -12.58 8.13   371 -0.35 2.69 -12.58 8.13   144 0.87 1.70 -3.57 5.61 
Cyclical component of 
government final 
consumption expenditure 
ggap % GDP 528 -0.00 0.63 -2.27 2.52   384 0.06 0.66 -2.27 2.52   144 -0.16 0.52 -1.50 1.51 
Current account balance cab % GDP 528 0.27 5.77 -17.96 25.09   384 0.14 5.63 -17. 25.09   144 0.61 6.15 -17.63 13.22 
Cyclically adjusted 
primary balance 
(potential GDP) 
capb_p % GDP 414 0.67 3.16 -25.41 9.05   270 0.04 3.33 -25.41 9.05   144 1.86 2.42 -3.68 8.79 
Cyclically adjusted 
primary balance (trend 
GDP) 
capb_t % GDP 414 0.57 3.40 -25.12 8.61   270 -0.14 3.54 -25.12 8.43   144 1.91 2.66 -6.69 8.61 
Indirect taxes indtax % GDP 414 12.61 1.78 7.68 15.94   270 12.40 1.91 7.68 15.94   144 13.01 1.42 9.91 15.89 
Direct taxes dirtax % GDP 414 12.40 3.17 4.53 21.09   270 12.24 3.25 4.53 18.83   144 12.69 3.01 6.40 21.09 
Investment expenditure invexp % GDP 414 3.05 0.91 1.00 5.46   270 3.13 0.88 1.00 5.46   144 2.88 0.95 1.07 5.26 
Non-investment 
expenditure 
consexp % GDP 414 40.64 6.28 24.37 58.93   270 41.28 6.46 24.37 58.93   144 39.45 5.75 25.68 53.15 
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TABLE 5. Estimation results. Fiscal reaction function, EU-12, dependent variable: primary balance 
  FE RE DK LSDVC 
  
1970-2013 
1970-1995 
& 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 1970-2013 
1970-1995 
& 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 1970-2013 
1970-1995 
& 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 1970-2013 
1970-1995 
& 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 
  All years Baseline Windfall All years Baseline Windfall All years Baseline Windfall All years Baseline Windfall 
∆pbalancet-1 
-0.163** -0.125 -0.251*** -0.161** -0.111 -0.239*** -0.163** -0.125* -0.251 -0.139*** -0.088 -0.186** 
(0.069) (0.074) (0.059) (0.070) (0.079) (0.065) (0.060) (0.058) (0.151) (0.042) (0.062) (0.085) 
∆debtt-1 
0.143*** 0.157*** 0.216* 0.138*** 0.158*** 0.157** 0.143*** 0.157*** 0.216*** 0.143*** 0.158*** 0.213*** 
(0.027) (0.041) (0.105) (0.024) (0.038) (0.069) (0.024) (0.024) (0.057) (0.029) (0.051) (0.050) 
ogapt 
0.072 0.113* -0.070 0.080 0.131** -0.155** 0.072 0.113* -0.070 0.070* 0.111 -0.074 
(0.060) (0.062) (0.084) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) (0.056) (0.118) (0.041) (0.109) (0.101) 
ggapt 
-1.604*** -1.651*** -1.408*** -1.576*** -1.599*** -1.537*** -1.604*** -1.651*** -1.408*** -1.590*** -1.627*** -1.398*** 
(0.159) (0.158) (0.345) (0.162) (0.162) (0.350) (0.406) (0.488) (0.279) (0.157) (0.248) (0.264) 
∆cabt 
-0.018 0.004 -0.050 -0.008 0.014 0.001 -0.018 0.004 -0.050 -0.017 0.004 -0.051 
(0.070) (0.092) (0.074) (0.066) (0.094) (0.060) (0.059) (0.064) (0.111) (0.058) (0.073) (0.094) 
constant 
-0.225*** -0.365*** 0.234*** -0.216*** -0.361*** 0.244** -0.225 -0.365 0.234 NA NA NA 
(0.032) (0.096) (0.051) (0.064) (0.137) (0.110) (0.194) (0.219) (0.374) 
   
N 402 258 144 402 258 144 402 258 144 402 258 132 
Within R2 0.2807 0.3394 0.2239 0.2805 0.3390 0.2127 0.2807 0.3394 0.2239 NA NA NA 
Between R2 0.0267 0.2636 0.0520 0.0308 0.2890 0.2302 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Overall R2 0.2755 0.3373 0.1963 0.2757 0.3378 0.2105 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Pesaran's test (p-
val) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Frees' test 
(statistic) 
1.397*** 1.102*** 1.194*** 1.455*** 1.047*** 1.206*** NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Breush-Pagan's 
test (p-val) 
NA NA NA 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Notes: The dependent variable is primary balance and the estimated model is given by ∆pbalanceit = αi + α1∙∆pbalanceit-1 + α2∙∆debtit-1 + α3∙ogapit + α4∙ggapit + α5∙∆cabit + εit. Core consists of 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Periphery encompasses Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. EU-12 is the sum of core and periphery. 
Variables definitions are reported in Table 3. The first row of the table lists the estimators used in the subsequent regressions, while the second row indicates time dimension of the sample. We 
use four types of panel data estimators: fixed effects (FE), random effects (RE), Driscoll–Kraay with corrected standard errors (DK) and a bias-corrected least squares dummy variables 
(LSDVC). For Breush-Pagan’s and Pesaran’s (2004) cross-section dependence test results shown are p-values. For Frees’ (2004) cross-section dependence test results shown are Q-statistics. 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars denote estimates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) levels. 
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TABLE 6. Estimation results. Fiscal reaction function, EU-12 core, dependent variable: primary balance 
  FE RE DK LSDVC 
  
1970-2013 
1970-1995 
& 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 1970-2013 
1970-1995 
& 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 1970-2013 
1970-1995 
& 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 1970-2013 
1970-1995 
& 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 
  All years Baseline Windfall All years Baseline Windfall All years Baseline Windfall All years Baseline Windfall 
∆pbalancet-1 
-0.217** -0.178** -0.216** -0.214*** -0.161** -0.244*** -0.217** -0.178* -0.216 -0.195*** -0.147* -0.157 
(0.078) (0.071) (0.062) (0.079) (0.076) (0.076) (0.087) (0.085) (0.138) (0.052) (0.086) (0.101) 
∆debtt-1 
0.121*** 0.132** 0.438** 0.120*** 0.138*** 0.260*** 0.121** 0.132** 0.438*** 0.121*** 0.135*** 0.428*** 
(0.032) (0.049) (0.136) (0.031) (0.049) (0.092) (0.037) (0.041) (0.112) (0.036) (0.050) (0.097) 
ogapt 
-0.025 -0.024 0.023 -0.013 0.014 -0.103 -0.025 -0.024 0.023 -0.027 -0.026 0.022 
(0.052) (0.081) (0.105) (0.057) (0.074) (0.106) (0.067) (0.069) (0.111) (0.068) (0.078) (0.149) 
ggapt 
-1.922*** -2.038*** -1.652*** -1.890*** -1.968*** -1.750*** -1.922*** -2.038*** -1.652*** -1.908*** -2.022*** -1.620*** 
(0.149) (0.215) (0.394) (0.144) (0.198) (0.440) (0.301) (0.376) (0.421) (0.256) (0.312) (0.557) 
∆cabt 
0.058 0.106 -0.083 0.061 0.113 -0.052 0.058 0.106 -0.083 0.061 0.109 -0.085 
(0.057) (0.099) (0.126) (0.059) (0.098) (0.116) (0.086) (0.104) (0.119) (0.077) (0.119) (0.131) 
constant 
-0.181*** -0.396*** 0.472*** -0.180*** -0.397*** 0.408*** -0.181 -0.396* 0.472 NA NA NA 
(0.037) (0.101) (0.058) (0.064) (0.152) (0.123) (0.209) (0.169) (0.461) 
   
N 250 166 84 250 166 84 250 166 84 250 166 77 
Within R2 0.2775 0.3555 0.2842 0.2774 0.3546 0.2592 0.2775 0.3555 0.2842 NA NA NA 
Between R2 0.2374 0.1237 0.1629 0.2046 0.1908 0.3655 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Overall R2 0.2743 0.3516 0.2144 0.2744 0.3526 0.2402 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Pesaran's test (p-
val) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Frees' test 
(statistic) 
1.222*** 0.804*** 1.162*** 1.251*** 0.737*** 1.470*** NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Breush-Pagan's 
test (p-val) 
NA NA NA 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Notes: The dependent variable is primary balance and the estimated model is given by ∆pbalanceit = αi + α1∙∆pbalanceit-1 + α2∙∆debtit-1 + α3∙ogapit + α4∙ggapit + α5∙∆cabit + εit. Core consists of 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Periphery encompasses Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. EU-12 is the sum of core and periphery. 
Variables definitions are reported in Table 3. The first row of the table lists the estimators used in the subsequent regressions, while the second row indicates time dimension of the sample. We 
use four types of panel data estimators: fixed effects (FE), random effects (RE), Driscoll–Kraay with corrected standard errors (DK) and a bias-corrected least squares dummy variables 
(LSDVC). For Breush-Pagan’s and Pesaran’s (2004) cross-section dependence test results shown are p-values. For Frees’ (2004) cross-section dependence test results shown are Q-statistics. 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars denote estimates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) levels. 
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TABLE 7. Estimation results. Fiscal reaction function, EU-12 periphery, dependent variable: primary balance 
  FE RE DK LSDVC 
  
1970-2013 
1970-1995 
& 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 1970-2013 
1970-1995 
& 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 1970-2013 
1970-1995 
& 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 1970-2013 
1970-1995 
& 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 
  All years Baseline Windfall All years Baseline Windfall All years Baseline Windfall All years Baseline Windfall 
∆pbalancet-1 
-0.089 -0.076 -0.273*** -0.084 -0.064 -0.220*** -0.089 -0.076 -0.273 -0.054 -0.016 -0.184* 
(0.132) (0.165) (0.059) (0.134) (0.172) (0.053) (0.084) (0.105) (0.150) (0.090) (0.160) (0.096) 
∆debtt-1 
0.164** 0.177** 0.106 0.155*** 0.172*** 0.083 0.164*** 0.177*** 0.106** 0.163*** 0.178** 0.106 
(0.042) (0.060) (0.088) (0.040) (0.058) (0.075) (0.025) (0.030) (0.037) (0.035) (0.069) (0.066) 
ogapt 
0.100 0.146 -0.195 0.106 0.161** -0.208 0.100 0.146* -0.195 0.098 0.141 -0.194 
(0.082) (0.086) (0.165) (0.083) (0.081) (0.155) (0.065) (0.062) (0.106) (0.065) (0.154) (0.149) 
ggapt 
-1.404*** -1.513*** -1.299** -1.375*** -1.452*** -1.359*** -1.404** -1.513** -1.299** -1.382*** -1.471** -1.280*** 
(0.194) (0.319) (0.309) (0.200) (0.308) (0.369) (0.465) (0.504) (0.293) (0.219) (0.575) (0.391) 
∆cabt 
-0.099 -0.102 -0.089 -0.076 -0.095 -0.053 -0.099 -0.102 -0.089 -0.099 -0.106 -0.082 
(0.137) (0.166) (0.158) (0.128) (0.161) (0.127) (0.119) (0.130) (0.157) (0.105) (0.168) (0.102) 
constant 
-0.289*** -0.242 0.019 -0.272* -0.214 0.023 -0.289 -0.242 0.019 NA NA NA 
(0.061) (0.169) (0.101) (0.148) (0.266) (0.226) (0.244) (0.364) (0.249) 
   
N 152 92 60 152 92 60 152 92 60 152 92 55 
Within R2 0.3120 0.3569 0.2466 0.3115 0.3563 0.2389 0.3120 0.3569 0.2466 NA NA NA 
Between R2 0.0564 0.2963 0.0364 0.0614 0.3359 0.0034 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Overall R2 0.3019 0.3510 0.2172 0.3023 0.3516 0.2267 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Pesaran's test (p-
val) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.6304 0.0000 0.0000 0.5360 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Frees' test 
(statistic) 
0.224** 0.271 -0.008 0.195** 0.279 0.066 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Breush-Pagan's 
test (p-val) 
NA NA NA 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Notes: The dependent variable is primary balance and the estimated model is given by ∆pbalanceit = αi + α1∙∆pbalanceit-1 + α2∙∆debtit-1 + α3∙ogapit + α4∙ggapit + α5∙∆cabit + εit. Core consists of 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Periphery encompasses Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. EU-12 is the sum of core and periphery. 
Variables definitions are reported in Table 3. The first row of the table lists the estimators used in the subsequent regressions, while the second row indicates time dimension of the sample. We 
use four types of panel data estimators: fixed effects (FE), random effects (RE), Driscoll–Kraay with corrected standard errors (DK) and a bias-corrected least squares dummy variables 
(LSDVC). For Breush-Pagan’s and Pesaran’s (2004) cross-section dependence test results shown are p-values. For Frees’ (2004) cross-section dependence test results shown are Q-statistics. 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars denote estimates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) levels. 
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TABLE 8. Estimation results. Coefficients of ∆debtt-1 from revenue and expenditure reaction functions, EU-12 core, EU-12 periphery and EU-12, dependent variable: direct taxes (panel A), 
indirect taxes (panel B), investment expenditure (panel C), non-investment expenditure (panel D) 
    FE RE DK LSDVC 
  
1970-2013 
1970-1995 
& 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 1970-2013 
1970-1995 
& 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 1970-2013 
1970-1995 
& 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 1970-2013 
1970-1995 
& 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 
Dependent 
variable 
Group of 
countries 
All years Baseline Windfall All years Baseline Windfall All years Baseline Windfall All years Baseline Windfall 
  
A. Direct 
taxes 
  
EU-12 
0.024*** 0.029*** 0.004 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.016 0.024*** 0.029*** 0.004 0.024*** 0.029 0.005 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.032) (0.007) (0.008) (0.024) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.018) (0.023) 
Core 
0.021 0.023 0.039 0.023 0.023 0.041 0.021 0.023 0.039* 0.021 0.024 0.038 
(0.013) (0.028) (0.028) (0.014) (0.024) (0.027) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.025) (0.046) 
Periphery 
0.023** 0.030** -0.012 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.003 0.023** 0.030** -0.012 0.022* 0.028 -0.011 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.051) (0.007) (0.009) (0.044) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.028) (0.036) 
  
B.Indirect 
taxes 
  
EU-12 
0.007 0.013 0.025* 0.009 0.013 0.015* 0.007 0.013* 0.025 0.006 0.013 0.024 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.014) (0.005) (0.011) (0.016) 
Core 
-0.013** -0.009 -0.008 -0.013*** -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.009 -0.008 -0.013 -0.010 -0.008 
(0.004) (0.009) (0.016) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.022) 
Periphery 
0.020* 0.023 0.038* 0.022*** 0.023* 0.031** 0.020* 0.023 0.038* 0.020** 0.022 0.037 
(0.009) (0.014) (0.017) (0.008) (0.014) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.019) (0.031) 
  
C.Investment 
expenditure 
  
EU-12 
-0.025*** -0.026*** -0.010 -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.017 -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.010* -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.010 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.010) 
Core 
-0.018*** -0.022** -0.002 -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.006 -0.018** -0.022** -0.002 -0.018*** -0.022*** -0.002 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.007) (0.019) 
Periphery 
-0.026** -0.028*** -0.010 -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.019 -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.010 -0.025*** -0.028** -0.009 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.016) (0.007) (0.006) (0.014) (0.005) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.013) (0.017) 
  
D.Non-
investment 
expenditure 
EU-12 
-0.097*** -0.120*** -0.115 -0.087*** -0.122*** -0.070 -0.097* -0.120* -0.115* -0.096*** -0.122** -0.115*** 
(0.021) (0.035) (0.076) (0.018) (0.027) (0.053) (0.051) (0.056) (0.057) (0.019) (0.052) (0.039) 
Core 
-0.099** -0.145** -0.321** -0.100** -0.161*** -0.205*** -0.099** -0.145*** -0.321** -0.099*** -0.148*** -0.315*** 
(0.038) (0.053) (0.103) (0.039) (0.047) (0.069) (0.027) (0.038) (0.112) (0.035) (0.046) (0.079) 
Periphery 
-0.115*** -0.123** -0.023 -0.104*** -0.122*** 0.020 -0.115 -0.123 -0.023 -0.114*** -0.124 -0.024 
(0.023) (0.039) (0.050) (0.020) (0.035) (0.037) (0.068) (0.070) (0.041) (0.041) (0.119) (0.052) 
Notes: In panel A the dependent variable are direct taxes and the estimated model is given by ∆dirtaxit = αi + α1∙∆dirtaxit-1 + α2∙∆debtit-1 + α3∙ogapit + α4∙ggapit + α5∙∆cabit + εit, in panel B the 
dependent variable are indirect taxes and the estimated model is given by ∆indtaxit = αi + α1∙∆indtaxit-1 + α2∙∆debtit-1 + α3∙ogapit + α4∙ggapit + α5∙∆cabit + εit, in panel C the dependent variable is 
investment expenditure and the estimated model is given by ∆invexpit = αi + α1∙∆invexpit-1 + α2∙∆debtit-1 + α3∙ogapit + α4∙ggapit + α5∙∆cabit + εit, in panel D the dependent variable is investment 
expenditure and the estimated model is given by ∆consexpit = αi + α1∙∆consexpit-1 + α2∙∆debtit-1 + α3∙ogapit + α4∙ggapit + α5∙∆cabit + εit. Core consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Periphery encompasses Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. EU-12 is the sum of core and periphery. Variables definitions are reported in 
Table 3. The first row of the table lists the estimators used in the subsequent regressions, while the second row indicates time dimension of the sample. We use four types of panel data 
estimators: fixed effects (FE), random effects (RE), Driscoll–Kraay with corrected standard errors (DK) and a bias-corrected least squares dummy variables (LSDVC). For Breush-Pagan's and 
Pesaran’s (2004) cross-section dependence test results shown are p-values. For Frees’ (2004) cross-section dependence test results shown are Q-statistics. Standard errors are given in 
parentheses. Stars denote estimates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) levels. 
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TABLE 9. Robustness analysis part I. Change in the dependent variable: cyclically adjusted primary balance based on trend GDP 
  EU-12 Core Periphery 
  
1970-2013 
1970-1995 & 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 1970-2013 
1970-1995 & 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 1970-2013 
1970-1995 & 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 
  All years Baseline Windfall All years Baseline Windfall All years Baseline Windfall 
∆capb_tt-1 
-0.158*** -0.132*** -0.302*** -0.221*** -0.120* -0.295*** -0.145* -0.165** -0.186*** 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.046) (0.059) (0.049) (0.043) (0.053) (0.055) (0.027) 
∆debtt-1 
0.162*** 0.163*** 0.228** 0.101** 0.079** 0.411** 0.192*** 0.196** 0.126 
(0.025) (0.040) (0.098) (0.029) (0.022) (0.138) (0.030) (0.059) (0.088) 
ggapt 
-1.076*** -1.177*** -0.589** -0.686*** -0.740*** -0.825** -1.412** -1.628** -0.547 
(0.201) (0.262) (0.228) (0.131) (0.108) (0.241) (0.327) (0.437) (0.334) 
∆cabt 
0.013 0.017 -0.023 0.100 0.193** -0.121 -0.087 -0.167 0.122 
(0.060) (0.092) (0.086) (0.064) (0.073) (0.116) (0.098) (0.154) (0.154) 
constant 
-0.246*** -0.313** -0.009 -0.145*** -0.197*** 0.306** -0.369*** -0.171 -0.278 
(0.036) (0.108) (0.057) (0.037) (0.053) (0.086) (0.052) (0.259) (0.166) 
N 388 244 144 251 167 84 137 77 60 
Within R2 0.1827 0.1936 0.2143 0.1107 0.1036 0.3245 0.2525 0.2755 0.1270 
Between R2 0.0431 0.1924 0.0117 0.0272 0.0379 0.1374 0.0052 0.0383 0.0012 
Overall R2 0.1790 0.1976 0.1649 0.1087 0.1004 0.2463 0.2467 0.2720 0.1052 
Pesaran's test (p-val) 0.0000 0.0046 0.0000 0.0000 0.0071 0.0000 0.0231 0.0947 0.1230 
Frees' test (statistic) 0.933*** 0.235 0.758*** 0.811*** 0.237* 0.772*** 0.238** 0.274 -0.035 
Notes: The estimated model is given by ∆capb_tit = αi + α1∙∆capb_tit-1 + α2∙∆debtit-1 + α3∙ggapit + α4∙∆cabit + εit. Only debtt-1 coefficients are presented, remaining estimates are available upon 
request. Core consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Periphery encompasses Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. EU-12 is the sum of 
core and periphery. Variables definitions are reported in Table 3. Presented regressions were carried out using fixed effects estimator. Results for other estimators are available on demand and 
they do not change our conclusions. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars denote estimates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) levels. 
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TABLE 10. Robustness analysis part II. Change in the dependent variable: cyclically adjusted primary balance based on potential GDP 
  EU-12 Core Periphery 
  
1970-2013 
1970-1995 & 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 1970-2013 
1970-1995 & 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 1970-2013 
1970-1995 & 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 
  All years Baseline Windfall All years Baseline Windfall All years Baseline Windfall 
∆capb_pt-1 
-0.188*** -0.147*** -0.345*** -0.240*** -0.133** -0.319*** -0.174** -0.171** -0.293*** 
(0.036) (0.034) (0.041) (0.058) (0.045) (0.037) (0.048) (0.052) (0.059) 
∆debtt-1 
0.138*** 0.145*** 0.199* 0.084** 0.064** 0.389** 0.165*** 0.178** 0.098 
(0.026) (0.042) (0.096) (0.031) (0.022) (0.133) (0.034) (0.062) (0.077) 
ggapt 
-1.179*** -1.253*** -0.742*** -0.857*** -0.882*** -1.002*** -1.448** -1.591** -0.707* 
(0.197) (0.249) (0.236) (0.105) (0.088) (0.224) (0.368) (0.459) (0.302) 
∆cabt 
-0.010 -0.017 -0.017 0.065 0.129 -0.101 -0.098 -0.174 0.087 
(0.071) (0.098) (0.083) (0.085) (0.092) (0.115) (0.122) (0.186) (0.163) 
constant 
-0.180*** -0.262** 0.062 -0.100** -0.154** 0.332*** -0.277*** -0.158 -0.212 
(0.037) (0.110) (0.059) (0.038) (0.053) (0.084) (0.059) (0.267) (0.165) 
N 385 242 143 250 166 84 135 76 59 
Within R2 0.1851 0.1963 0.2335 0.1328 0.1214 0.3310 0.2372 0.2593 0.1569 
Between R2 0.0425 0.1507 0.0186 0.4074 0.0148 0.1075 0.0244 0.0750 0.0189 
Overall R2 0.1825 0.1981 0.1947 0.1297 0.1182 0.2544 0.2338 0.2560 0.1403 
Pesaran's test (p-val) 0.0000 0.0060 0.0000 0.0000 0.0061 0.0000 0.0504 0.1298 0.5128 
Frees' test (statistic) 0.606*** -0.002 0.319** 0.766*** 0.312* 0.412** 0.048 -0.320 -0.257 
Notes: The estimated model is given by ∆capb_pit = αi + α1∙∆capb_pit-1 + α2∙∆debtit-1 + α3∙ggapit + α4∙∆cabit + εit. Only debtt-1 coefficients are presented, remaining estimates are available upon 
request. Core consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Periphery encompasses Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. EU-12 is the sum of 
core and periphery. Variables definitions are reported in Table 3. Presented regressions were carried out using fixed effects estimator. Results for other estimators are available on demand and 
they do not change our conclusions. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars denote estimates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) levels. 
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TABLE 11. Robustness analysis part III. Exclusion of a country from the sample 
  EU-12 Core Periphery 
Excluded 
country 
1970-2011 
1970-1995 & 
2008-2011 
1996-2007 1970-2011 
1970-1995 & 
2008-2011 
1996-2007 1970-2011 
1970-1995 & 
2008-2011 
1996-2007 
All years Baseline Windfall All years Baseline Windfall All years Baseline Windfall 
Austria 
0.141*** 0.156*** 0.206* 0.112** 0.125* 0.446** NA NA NA 
(0.028) (0.043) (0.107) (0.031) (0.051) (0.160) 
   
Belgium 
0.148*** 0.155*** 0.217* 0.133** 0.123 0.462** NA NA NA 
(0.029) (0.044) (0.109) (0.049) (0.074) (0.149) 
   
Finland 
0.146*** 0.154*** 0.230* 0.124** 0.105 0.529*** NA NA NA 
(0.030) (0.047) (0.114) (0.040) (0.063) (0.113) 
   
France 
0.143*** 0.156*** 0.209* 0.117** 0.132** 0.443** NA NA NA 
(0.027) (0.042) (0.108) (0.031) (0.049) (0.164) 
   
Germany 
0.138*** 0.158*** 0.174* 0.099*** 0.119* 0.341** NA NA NA 
(0.028) (0.044) (0.090) (0.022) (0.056) (0.126) 
   
Luxembourg 
0.146*** 0.160*** 0.209* 0.126** 0.139** 0.449** NA NA NA 
(0.027) (0.042) (0.107) (0.034) (0.051) (0.173) 
   
Netherlands 
0.154*** 0.174*** 0.183* 0.145** 0.182*** 0.380* NA NA NA 
(0.027) (0.040) (0.098) (0.037) (0.020) (0.157) 
   
Greece 
0.123*** 0.120** 0.339*** NA NA NA 0.136 0.124 0.250 
(0.030) (0.043) (0.100) 
   
(0.073) (0.081) (0.117) 
Ireland 
0.160*** 0.181*** 0.243* NA NA NA 0.203*** 0.223** 0.121 
(0.023) (0.036) (0.132) 
   
(0.023) (0.050) (0.125) 
Italy 
0.140*** 0.161*** 0.194* NA NA NA 0.162** 0.186* 0.057 
(0.029) (0.044) (0.103) 
   
(0.049) (0.066) (0.055) 
Portugal 
0.143*** 0.163*** 0.210* NA NA NA 0.164* 0.191* 0.086 
(0.029) (0.045) (0.109) 
   
(0.054) (0.077) (0.088) 
Spain 
0.132*** 0.138*** 0.212* NA NA NA 0.144** 0.143* 0.097 
(0.025) (0.040) (0.110) 
   
(0.042) (0.059) (0.091) 
Notes: The estimated model is given by ∆pbalanceit = αi + α1∙∆pbalanceit-1 + α2∙∆debtit-1 + α3∙ogapit + α4∙ggapit + α5∙∆cabit + εit. Only debtt-1 coefficients are presented, remaining estimates are 
available upon request. The sample of the countries consists of EU-12, core or periphery, respectively, without a country mentioned in the column named “excluded country”. Variables 
definitions are reported in Table 3. All regressions were carried out with the fixed effects estimator as previously, there were no major differences between the various methods. Results for other 
estimators are available on demand and they do not change our conclusions. Results shown are coefficients, while standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars denote estimates significance at 
1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) levels. 
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TABLE 12. Robustness analysis part IV. Change in definition of countries included in periphery group 
  Core group with Italy Periphery group without Italy 
  
1970-2013 
1970-1995 & 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 1970-2013 
1970-1995 & 
2008-2013 
1996-2007 
  All years Baseline Windfall All years Baseline Windfall 
∆pbalancet-1 
-0.190** -0.152* -0.207** -0.125 -0.116 -0.310*** 
(0.078) (0.065) (0.062) (0.145) (0.184) (0.041) 
∆debtt-1 
0.129*** 0.124** 0.456*** 0.162** 0.186* 0.057 
(0.029) (0.045) (0.115) (0.049) (0.066) (0.055) 
ogapt 
0.054 0.086 0.039 0.071 0.131 -0.316 
(0.084) (0.106) (0.085) (0.092) (0.099) (0.134) 
ggapt 
-1.633*** -1.641*** -1.638*** -1.567*** -1.710** -1.412** 
(0.309) (0.393) (0.337) (0.119) (0.314) (0.306) 
∆cabt 
0.073 0.133 -0.078 -0.131 -0.140 -0.144 
(0.062) (0.094) (0.115) (0.156) (0.192) (0.180) 
constant 
-0.163*** -0.301** 0.429*** -0.354*** -0.322 0.032 
(0.040) (0.100) (0.049) (0.059) (0.171) (0.082) 
N 282 186 96 120 72 48 
Within R2 0.2526 0.3098 0.3095 0.3412 0.4007 0.2866 
Between R2 0.0708 0.3988 0.1295 0.0978 0.3830 0.0840 
Overall R2 0.2514 0.3107 0.2336 0.3293 0.3894 0.2569 
Pesaran's test (p-val) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9925 
Frees' test (statistic) 1.143*** 0.609*** 0.832*** 0.082 0.421** -0.123 
Notes: The estimated model is given by ∆pbalanceit = αi + α1∙∆pbalanceit-1 + α2∙∆debtit-1 + α3∙ogapit + α4∙ggapit + α5∙∆cabit + 
εit. Periphery definition is changed to negative interest rate-growth differential during the windfall period, which results in 
moving Italy from periphery to core. Core consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands. Periphery encompasses Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. EU-12 is the sum of core and periphery. 
Variables definitions are reported in Table 3. Presented regressions were carried out using fixed effects estimator. Results 
for other estimators are available on demand and they do not change our conclusions. Standard errors are given in 
parentheses. Stars denote estimates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) levels. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 13. Robustness analysis part V. Change in definition of windfall period 
  EU-12 Core Periphery 
  
1970-1998 & 
2008-2013 
1999-2007 
1970-1998 & 
2008-2013 
1999-2007 
1970-1998 & 
2008-2013 
1999-2007 
  Baseline Windfall Baseline Windfall Baseline Windfall 
∆pbalancet-1 
-0.157* -0.312*** -0.230* -0.325*** -0.088 -0.334** 
(0.083) (0.065) (0.111) (0.073) (0.142) (0.119) 
∆debtt-1 
0.132** 0.219* 0.082 0.375** 0.167* 0.163 
(0.046) (0.107) (0.054) (0.135) (0.063) (0.117) 
ogapt 
0.090 0.069 -0.059 0.253** 0.136 -0.117 
(0.072) (0.120) (0.088) (0.080) (0.086) (0.188) 
ggapt 
-1.599*** -1.918*** -1.958*** -2.063*** -1.486*** -1.718 
(0.181) (0.432) (0.196) (0.207) (0.259) (0.820) 
∆cabt 
-0.018 0.020 0.111 -0.067 -0.129 0.040 
(0.101) (0.076) (0.096) (0.105) (0.177) (0.151) 
constant 
-0.129 -0.380** -0.075 -0.334* -0.143 -0.216 
(0.088) (0.134) (0.096) (0.144) (0.140) (0.188) 
N 296 106 187 63 109 43 
Within R2 0.2763 0.3550 0.2687 0.4169 0.3317 0.3640 
Between R2 0.2622 0.0443 0.0007 0.3887 0.3145 0.3379 
Overall R2 0.2734 0.3259 0.2652 0.3370 0.3208 0.2937 
Pesaran's test (p-val) 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0087 0.0000 1.1244 
Frees' test (statistic) 2.047*** 0.387* 1.541*** 0.472** 0.506*** -0.276 
Notes: The estimated model is given ∆pbalanceit = αi + α1∙∆pbalanceit-1 + α2∙∆debtit-1 + α3∙ogapit + α4∙ggapit + α5∙∆cabit + εit. 
Windfall period definition is changed to beginning with accession to the Euro area, which results in a timespan 1999-2007 
(2001-2007 for Greece). Core consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
Periphery encompasses Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. EU-12 is the sum of core and periphery. Variables 
definitions are reported in Table 3. Presented regressions were carried out using fixed effects estimator. Results for other 
estimators are available on demand and they do not change our conclusions. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars 
denote estimates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) levels. 
 
